In this paper, we formulate a qualitative "lin ear" utility theory for lotteries in which un certainty is expressed qualitatively using a Spohnian disbelief function. We argue that a rational decision maker facing an uncertain decision problem in which the uncertainty is expressed qualitatively should behave so as to maximize "qualitative expected utility." Our axiomatization of the qualitative util ity is similar to the axiomatization developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern for prob abilistic lotteries. We compare our results with other recent results in qualitative de cision making.
Introduction
The main goal of this paper is to construct a lin ear utility theory for lotteries in which uncertainty is described by epistemic beliefs as described by Spohn [20, 21] .
Spohn's theory of epistemic beliefs is finding increasing acceptance in artificial intelligence since it is viewed as a qualitative counterpart of Bayesian probability theory. Spohn's theory is also referred to as "kappa calculus." It has its roots in Adams's [1] work on the logic of conditionals, and has been studied extensively by Goldszmidt and Pearl [10, 11] who refer to it as "rank-based system" and "qualitative probabilities." The main representation function in Spohn's calculus is called a disbelief function and its values can be in terpreted as infinitesimal or order of magnitude prob abilities. Spohn's calculus includes conditional dis belief functions and a notion of conditional indepen dence that satisfies the graphoid axioms [12] . This means that the qualitative theory of (probabilistic) Bayesian networks based on conditional independence applies unchanged to Spohn's calculus. Furthermore the definitions of combination (pointwise addition [18] ) and marginalization (minimization) in Spohn's calcu lus satisfies the axioms described by Shenoy and Shafer [19] that enable local computation. Thus the message passing architectures for computing marginals such as the Shenoy-Shafer architecture [19] and the Hugin ar chitecture [13] apply also to Spohn's calculus.
One of the major attractions of Bayesian probability theory is a normative decision theory based on von Neumann and Morgenstern's and Savage's theories of rational decision making by maximizing expected util ity (or maximizing subjective expected utility in the case of Savage). The focus of this paper is to propose a qualitative linear utility theory for Spohn's calculus so that an analogous decision theory can be formulated for problems in which uncertainty is characterized by epistemic beliefs. We propose axioms analogous to the axioms proposed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (as described by Luce and Raiffa [14] ) and describe a representation theorem that states that if the de cision makers preferences satisfy these axioms, then there exists a unique qualitative linear utility function such that the utility of any Spohnian lottery is equal to the "expected" utility of the lottery.
An outline of the remainder of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we briefly describe Spohn's epistemic be lief calculus. In Section 3, we define Spohnian lotter ies, qualitative utility function, state the axioms, and state and prove the main result. We also describe a small example to illustrate the use of the linear utility function. In Section 4, we discuss the implications of the results and explain the significance of the results using probabilistic semantics of Spohn's calculus. In Section 5, we compare our findings with related re search on qualitative decision making theories. Finally in Section 6, we conclude with a summary and some concluding remarks. 2 
Spohn's Theory of Epistemic Beliefs
Spohn's theory of epistemic beliefs [20, 21, 10] is an elegant, simple and powerful calculus designed to rep resent and reason with plain human beliefs. The mo tivation behind Spohn's theory is the need for (i) a formalism to represent plain epistemic beliefs and ( ii) procedures for revising beliefs when new information is obtained.
The main ingredients of Spohn's theory are (i) a func tional representation of an epistemic state called a dis belief function, and ( ii) a rule for revising this function in light of new information. Like a probability dis tribution function, a disbelief function for a variable is completely specified by its values for the singleton subsets of configurations of the variable.
Formally, let 0 denote a set of possible worlds. We as sume n is finite, IOI = m. We use w (with subscripts) to denote a world, i.e. w E 0. If we are interested in a finite set of variables {X 1, X 2, ... , X n} each of those is also finite, 0 can be identified with Cartesian product xfOx; where Ox denotes the set of possible values of X. Thus, each world w E 0 is identified with a tu ple of values (x1, X2, ... , Xn) where Xi is a value of Xi. We also use notation w(i) to denote value of variable Xi in the world W and Xi = X to denote the subset { w E Ol w( i) = X} of n.
A Spohnian disbelief function t5 for 0 is defined as a mapping t5 : 2 11 ____ _. z+ u { oo} where z+ is set of non-negative integers, satisfying the following axioms: S1 and S2 min t5 ( { w}) = 0
As a result of Axiom (S2), a disbelief function is com pletely determined by its values for singletons. Thus for computational reasons, we can represent a disbelief function by a disbelief potential {j : n ----> z+ u { 00 }.
For A � 0 such that t5(A) < oo, the conditional dis belief function 6( .lA) is defined as
It is easy to verify that t5(.1A) is a disbelief function, i.e., it satisfies 81 and 82.
The notion of independence for Spohn's epistemic be lief is defined similar to that of probability. A and B are independent events if t5(A n B) = t5(A) + t5(B). Or in terms of variable we say that Xi and X1 are inde pendent if t5(Xi =a, X1 =b ) = t5(Xi =a)+ t5(Xj =b) where a, b are arbitrary values of Xi, X1 respectively. It is easy to note that axioms 81 through S3 which describe the static and dynamic aspects of modeling uncertainty have a similar role to that of Kolmogorov's axioms and Bayes's rule in probability.
To define the semantics of disbelief functions, we will define a related function called a Spohnian belief func tion. Given disbelief function t5, we can define a Spoh nian belief function (3 : 2 11 ----> Z U { -oo, oo} (where Z is the set of all integers) as follows [18] :
where A c is the complement of A in 0. 
Spohnian Lotteries and Their Utilities
Following Luce and Raiffa [14] , we use the term Spoh nian lottery to denote a lottery in which uncertainty is modeled by a Spohnian disbelief function. Let 0 = { o1, 02, ... , Or} denote a finite set of prizes in volved in a lottery. We assume, without loss of gen erality, a strict preference order over the set of prizes in which the prizes are again lotteries. We use L to denote the set of all lotteries, simple or compound.
Graphically, a lottery is a rooted tree whose leaves are prizes and associated with branches outgoing from a node is a (conditional) disbelief function. So we can define a lottery's depth as the depth of the correspond ing tree. For example, a prize is a lottery of depth 0, a simple lottery has depth 1, and so on. In Fig  ure 1 Axiom 1 (Ordering of prizes) The prefer-ence r-e lation >-over the set of pr-izes 0 is complete and tran sitive.
This axiom simply formalizes our assumption about the set of prizes. The intuition behind this axiom is as follows. The compound lottery Lc can be interpreted as two stage process. The outcomes possible for the first stage are x1, x2, ... , . 'Ek. If x; realizes, the lottery player gets simple lottery L; which in turn has set of outcomes Y l, Y2, ... , Yr· If YJ realizes, the player is rewarded with o1 . Another way to view Lc is by collapsing the two stages together to obtain a lottery with the set of pos sible outcomes {(x;y1)11 � i � k and 1 � j � r}. When a (*YJ) is realizes (wildcard * can match with any x), the player is rewarded with prize o1 . So the degree of disbelief the player associates with getting prize o1 is disbelief degree he assigns to set *YJ. As per Spohn's calculus, the disbelief degree associated with combined state X;YJ is calculated by b; + h:ij· Hence, disbelief degree assigned to set *YJ is min{ Dj + h:ij 11 � i � k}.
This requirement is the same as presented in Luce and Raiffa and it conveys the idea that preference relation reflects the desirability of a lottery and that desirabil ity is not context sensitive.
Axiom 4 (Quasi-continuity) For each prize o;, there exists a standard lottery that is indifferent to it.
In particular, we assume 01 '"" [o1.0, Or . oo] and Or '"" [o1.oo, Or.O]. This is reasonable since in [o1.0, Or . oo], we believe in o1 with certainty, and in [o1.oo, Or.OJ, we be lieve in Or with certainty. A comparison with the con tinuity assumption adopted for probabilistic case may give an impression that this assumption is too strong because set of standard (qualitative) lotteries does not constitute a continuum. We hold that it is quite rea sonable since :=::: should be read as "qualitatively pre ferred to". One can regard the set of standard lotteries as a fishing net that spreads from most preferred lot tery o1 to the least preferred one Or. Therefore, any lottery L is caught between a pair of successive knots, for example, between say [o1.0,or.k] and [o1.0,or.k+1]. So what this axiom entails is to disallow the ambiva lence and force a "qualitative indifference" between L and one of the two standard lotteries. 
The intuition behind this axiom is as follows. In the first case (i) when K1 = K� = 0, we believe (using function (3 given in equation (1) We have the following lemma that states that the set of Spohnian lotteries divided by the indifference relation is isomorphic to the set of standard lotteries.
Lemma 1 If the prefe'T'ence 'T'elation t on the set of lotteries L satisfies axioms 1 though 6, then fo'T' each lottery there exists one and only one standa'T'd lottery indifferent to it.
Proof: We prove the existence of indifferent standard lottery by induction on the depth of lottery trees.
For a constant lottery (of depth 0), because of axiom 4, each prize oi is indifferent to a standard lottery 8i. For a lottery L of depth n + 1. This lottery is a com pound lottery whose prizes are lotteries of depth not greater than n. Because of induction hypothesis, each prize of L is indifferent to a standard lottery. By sub stitutability, L is indifferent to a compound lottery of depth 2. Again by induction hypothesis, there is a standard lottery indifferent to it. Finally, we have to show that there is only one stan dard lottery indifferent to a given lottery. Suppose there are two standard lotteries s1, 82 E S such that s1 "' Land 82 "' L. By axiom 5, we have 81 "' s2. But by axiom 6, it is possible only if 81 = 82.
• From a decision theoretic perspective, we would like to model a preference relation t on the set of all lotteries L by a utility function u :
Notice that unlike traditional quantitative utility function which has range in the real line, the function u has value in a discrete set which in this ca<;e is the set of integers and the labels -= and =· From Lemma 1, it is clear that if we find a way to assign utility values to standard lotteries then it is straightforward to do so for any lottery.
Next we define an utility function for standard lotter ies. We abbreviate 8 = [o1.K1, Or.Kr] by a pair (K:1, K:r)· From the qualitative monotonicity axiom, it is clear that the following function will satisfy the definition of a qualitative utility function above: (4) For maintaining the analogy with the case of proba bilistic lotteries, we will define a utility function as a function U : L ___, B0 where B0 is defined as follows:
Even though B0 is a subset of (z+ U {=}) x (z+ U { =}) , we can define a complete and transitive order � on the set Bo as follows: ( x 1, yi) � ( x2, Y2) if and only if Y1 -. -: r1 � Y2 -x2. Alternatively, notice that Equation 4 establishes an isomorphism between Bo and ZU { -=, = }. Therefore, B0 inherits all the order relations of
Since B0 is a set of binary vectors, addition of a scalar, and pointwise minimization are defined as usual. Sup pose c E z+, b = (x,y) and hi= (xi,Yi)
Next, we state and prove a "qualitative linear utility" representation theorem that is analogous to the repre sentation theorem of von Neumann and Morgenstern. Proof: First we prove the existence of a qualitative utility function U : L __, B0 by constructing it as follows. For standard lotteries, U is defined as follows:
For an arbitrary lottery L, we define U(L) U( s) where sis the standard lottery that is indifferent to L. By Lemma 1, each lottery L is indifferent to exactly one standard lottery s. Therefore the function U is a well-defined qualitative utility function.
Next, we will show that U as constructed above sat isfies Therefore U(L) = min1:::; i:::; r {8i + U( oi)}. By induc tion on the lottery's depth, we can prove this property for any general lottery.
The proof of the fact that U defined above is the only qualitative utility function satisfying
First, we will show that u has value in both "half lines" {( 0, y)} and {(x, 0)}. Suppose to the contrary, u(L) We will now show that u(s{o,o}) = (0, 0). Suppose to the contrary u(s{o,o}) = (0, k) with k > 0. From the previous step, we can assume there are lotteries s1, s2 such that u(si) = (0, k) and u(s2) We can use the Dirichlet principle to show that u(s{o,m}) = (O,m). Suppose u(s{o,m}) = (O, n). Con sider case n < m. Since s{o,m} >-s{o,m-1} >-. .. > s{o,o}, we have m + 1 different lotteries but only n + 1 slots for utility values from (0, 0) to (0, n) . Thus, two lotteries one of which is strictly preferred to the other, must be given the same value by u leading to a contra diction. In case n > m, consider lotteries of the form [s{o,o} .8, s{o,m} . 0] where 8 :S n. Applying the right hand side of Equation 7 for them, we see that every of n + 1 slots from (0, 0) to (0, n) must be filled by a lottery in L. Using Lemma 1 these slots must be filled by standard lotteries. But between s{o,o} to s{o,m} , there are only m + 1 standard lotteries again leading to a contradiction.
Thus, if u is a qualitative utility function satisfying equation 7 then u = U. In other words, U is unique.
• Figure 3 illustrates the calculation of expected utility and o1 is the best prize and o3 is the worst prize.
Notice that when L is a simple lottery, Equation 7 can be rewritten as which is structurally similar to von Neumann -Mor genstern's expected utility formula. Multiplication in probability is replaced by addition in Spohn's theory. And addition in probability theory is replaced by min imization in Spohn's theory. Therefore, we refer to the right hand side of Equation 7 as "qualitative ex pected utility." We have used B0 as a scale for mea suring preferences. However, this is done only to show that the form of the utility function in Equation 7 is analogous to the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility for probabilistic lotteries. Using Equation 4, we can use Z U { -oo, oo} as the scale of the utility function.
One difference between qualitative and quantitative lotteries should be noted. While quantitative util ity uses a continuous scale (real numbers), qualitative utility use a discrete scale. So one should not expect a smooth gradation in utility for qualitative lotteries as is the case for probabilistic lotteries. For example, consider two prizes o; >-oi+1 that are successive in the sense that there is no other prize in between them i.e. there is no OJ such that o; >-Dj >-oi+1. Consider a lot tery of the form Thus the qualitative utility scale is unable to always make fine distinctions that the probabilistic utility the ory can make.
Example: Building Houses in an Earthquake Zone.
Outcomes. Houses that can survive an earthquake of intensity k where 0 :::; k :::; 12 are measured in Mercalli Intensity Scale 2 , which ranks earthquakes in terms of magnitude of destruction they cause for structures:
Qualitative Utility of an Earthquake-Proof Res idence. Let us consider the following hypothetical situation. A person is planning to build her house in a earthquake-prone region. When the homeowner considers what earthquake intensity her house should withstand, she may not be able to relate a certain in tensity, say q5, with an uncertain situation involving only no earthquake (q0) and the most intense earth quake (q12). However, in terms of financial cost, ob viously the higher the earthquake intensity a house can survive the costlier it is. So, the homeowner will definitely prefer q0 >-q1 >-... >-q12. We can as sociate an earthquake of intensity k with a pair of numbers ( ak, bk) as follows. The damage caused by earthquakes can range from no perceptible damage to complete destruction. Thus we set o1 as no damage and Or as complete destruction. For each earthquake intensity, we find an equally preferred standard lottery and denote the disbelief function by (ak, bk) · An ex ample of one set of such assessments is shown in Ta ble below. One interpretation of the assessments is that the damage caused by earthquakes of intensity up to 2 is viewed as "acceptable" since they are all equally preferred to standard lotteries where the homeowner believes the outcome is no damage (to different de grees, of course), and damage caused by earthquakes of intensity 4 or more are "unacceptable" since they are all equally preferred to standard lotteries where the homeowner believes the outcome is complete de struction (to different degrees). The damage caused by intensity 3 earthquake lies between these two cate gories.
Given that "scientists have never predicted a major earthquake, nor do they know how or expect to know how any time in the foreseeable future" (The United States Geological Surveys' web site), it seems there is not sufficient information to produce a probability dis tribution of earthquakes in a certain region. However, the subjective epistemic belief about EQ occurrence may be represented in the form of a Spohnian epis temic disbelief function 60,61, ... , 612, i.e., the home owner believes (to degree 1) that an earthquake of in tensity 4 will occur during her ownership of her new home.
The above situation can be seen to satisfy the axioms of qualitative utility. Therefore, we can estimate "ex pected utility" of the situation.
U ( [qo.6a, . .. ,q12·612])= min {6i+U( qi )} (10) o:::; i92
Suppose the information is given in the following table EQ Intensity Utility assessment 6i
The calculation of qualitative expected utility of the situation results in (1, 0) . That ranks the given un certain situation in between earthquakes of intensity 3 and 4, i. e., slightly unacceptable. In other words, the prospective homeowner should build her home so that it can survive an earthquake of intensity 4.
•
4
Qualitative vs. Quantitative Utility So far, we have discussed essentially ordinal relation ship among qualitative lotteries. Thanks to the ordi nal semantics, the proposed qualitative utility theory is well suited for situations when quantitative assess ment of the strength of belief and/or the desirability of consequences is difficult. Various reasons contribute to that difficulty such as the nature of a problem, and the subjective ability of assessors, or the cost of doing an assessment. In practice, ordinal information is often represented by numbers. Thus in practice, informa tion is rarely purely quantitative or purely qualitative, but somewhere in between. For example, by assum ing an objective probability distribution for prizes of lotteries, utility theory in probabilistic lottery frame work considered by von Neumann and Morgenstern is quantitative. But when the theory is applied in prac tice, often, the required probability distribution is ob tained through some conversion of subjective opinions or sparse statistical data. In that sense, the applica tion of the theory is somewhat qualitative.
For the qualitative utility theory based on Spohn epistemic belief developed here, the question we ad dress in this section is how can quantitative informa tion be used when it is available. It is well known that one interpretation of Spohnian disbelief degree is the order-of-magnitude approximation of probabilities [20, 21, 10, 5, 23, 11] . The idea is to express probability as a polynomial function of some E > 1 n P,(w) = L:: ai * E-i i;::: o
where 0 :::; ai < E. That is, 0 · a o a1 ... an is a numeri cal representation of P(w) in the E-base system. Then the degree of disbelief is the absolute value of the or der of the polynomial which is the smallest index with strictly positive coefficient. Note that since P,(w) :::; 1 and E > 1, the order of P, is non-positive. The same result can be obtained though a logarithmic transfor mation K(w) = l-log,(P(w) )J. Suppose E = 10, for example, .325 = 3 * c 1 + 2 * c 2 + 5 * c 3 . Thus, the degree of disbelief associated with a probability in the interval [.1, 1] is 0. When probability is in [.01, .1) dis belief degree is 1, and so on. In other words, we have the following rule: the degree of disbelief is the num ber of leading zeros in the E-based representation of a probability.
Thus, Spohn's calculus can be interpreted in the light of manipulation of orders of probability polynomials. The order of sum of two polynomials equals the max imum of the two orders. And the order of product of two polynomials is the sum of the two orders.
The idea of representing a number as a polyno mial function can also shed some light on the ex pected qualitative utility formula (7). Let us con sider a von Neumann-Morgenstern lottery L [p 1.o1, P2· o 2, ... ,pn.On] where Pi is the probability of winning prize o;. Assume o1 ?-o 2 ?-. .. On and also that utility of prizes is normalized i.e. u(o1) = 1 and u(on) = 0. The expected utility of the lottery u(L) is shown to be n
Now let us express p;, u(L) and u(o;) as polynomi als of some E > 1 i.e. Pi = Pi(E), u(L) = L(E) and u(o;) = Oi(E). We shall abuse notation slightly by considering K as operator that extracts the absolute value of the order of a polynomial i.e. K(P(E)) is the absolute value of order of P(E) . Now applying K oper ator on both sides of equation (12) with value replaced by corresponding polynomials we have
By definition of K, the right hand side of (13) expands
Comparing (15) and (7), we see that the ex pected qualitative utility theorem is in agreement with (quantitative ) expected utility theorem if we interpret disbelief degree and qualitative utility as order-of-magnitude abstraction of probability and von Neumann-Morgenstern utility respectively.
Related Work
In the literature, Dubois and Prade [8, 9, 6] propose a qualitative decision theory based on possibility the ory. There are certain facts that make their proposal comparable to our study. First, there is a close rela tion between possibility theory and Spohn's epistemic belief theory as pointed out in [7] . The possibility of a proposition 1r(x) is related to the degree of disbe lief by the relation 1r(x) = exp( -8 (x)), and vice versa. Second, Dubois and Prade base their proposal on von Neumann and Morgenstern's axioms as we do in this study.
However, there are several important differences. First, the setting in [8] is to qualitatively compare be lief states given a fixed act where as the setting in our study is to compare acts given a fixed state of belief. ("precision is safer" ) is imposed just by informational consideration. This axiom is contradicts our axiom 6 ("qualitative monotonicity" ) . When proposing Ax iom 6, we have stated the rationale for adopting it. Let us consider an example. There are two situations, x denotes a loss of $1,000 and y denotes a gain of $1,000,000. Dubois-Prade's Axiom 3 would suggest that the loss of $1,000 with certainty has no less util ity than a lottery in which a loss of $1,000 and a gain of $1,000,000 are equally possible. However, according to our Axiom 6, the latter lottery is preferred to the former.
Another difference between Dubois-Prade's and our proposals is in how compound lotteries are handled as summarized in their Axiom 5 and our Axiom 2. In our proposal, as in von Neumann-Morgenstern theory, the notion of independence between betting stages is exploited to derive the rule for reducing multi-stage lotteries. In Dubois-Prade's Axiom 5, just conser vative reasoning is invoked. We feel that incorpo rating independence information in the rule for ma nipulating compound lotteries, like in von Neumann Morgenstern's work, makes a decision theory more re alistic and practical than ignoring it. Although we are aware of problems and difficulties in justifying in dependence when all one has is information about ir relevance or lack of interaction, in practice people do perceive those notions interchangeably. In some situ ations, people may behave very cautiously, but they often rationally engage in risky business if the risk is reasonable for them.
In [6] , for a possibilistic lottery that is defined in a way similar to our lottery construction, there are two kinds of utilities called the "pessimistic" and "optimistic" utilities that are obtained by using two different sets of rules. Obviously, optimal decision depends on which utility is employed. In other words, there is informa tion about the meta-preference provided by users that is not covered within the formal systems proposed by the authors. In contrast, our utility theory doesn't make any assumption about the risk attitude of the decision maker as in the case of von Neumann and Morgenstern's theory. This feature allows us to avoid the ambiguity a user faces when she wants to use pos sibilistic utility.
However, it is important to note that in simple sit uations like the one in Savage's omelette example, a decision maker using a pessimistic utility function can be modeled as a user who follows our qualitative utility theory.
An interesting line of work in qualitative decision have been pursued by Brafman and Tennenholtz [3, 4] . The authors adopt an axiomatic approach argued by Sav age [17] and characterize conditions under which an agent can be said as using maximin, minimax re gret, competitive ratios and maximax decision crite ria. They show that these very different criteria are equivalent in terms of representation power. In partic ular, the representation theorem for maximin rule says that if an agent's preference satisfies a property simi lar to Savage's sure thing principle and a transitive-like property then the agent's decision can be modeled by maximin rule. Purely qualitative rule such as maximin is justified because in their setting the consideration of chance or likelihood of possible worlds is ignored. In our setting, the notion of beliefs of possible worlds enters explicitly in decision making. It can be easily shown that preference based on the notion of expected qualitative utility we develop here cannot be modeled by a simple maximin rule.
Qualitative decision based on Spohn's calculus has also been studied by Pearl and his associates at UCLA [10, 16, 11, 22, 5, 2] and Wilson [23] . They show that a disbelief degree (ranking) can be viewed as order-of magnitude probabilities. A similar idea can be traced back to Adams [1] (see [15] for a discussion). These au thors successfully use the relationship between kappa rankings and probability to solve problems in non monotonic reasoning, for example, defining probabilis tic semantics for default rules and conditional ought statements. They provide various set of decision mak ing rules justified by semantics of non-standard prob ability. However, none of these studies approach the problem from an axiomatic point of view as we do in this paper. We conjecture that most of these results can be justified by using our qualitative utility func tion and some assumptions of the nature of the utility function.
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Summary and Conclusions
Our goal in this paper is to propose a utility theory for Spohnian lotteries in which the uncertainty of win ning different prizes is expressed by epistemic beliefs. The utility function obtained is qualitative in the sense that a discrete scale is used. Also, in the formula of expected utility, minimization and addition operations are used in place of addition and multiplication in the formula for quantitative expected utility. This seems to make sense for lotteries in which uncertainty is char acterized qualitatively by disbelief values. Method ologically, we adapt the construction of a linear utility function for the case of probabilistic lotteries to the case of Spohnian lotteries. We show that preference among Spohnian lotteries that is required to satisfy some plausible axioms can be represented by an anal ogous qualitative linear utility function.
Decision making based on qualitative expected utility is somewhere in between purely qualitative rules such as maximin, minimax regret or maximax on one hand, and the purely quantitative rule of maximizing von Neumann-Morgenstern's expected utility on the other hand. Unlike, for example, the maximin rule which focuses on the worst possible outcome, our qualitative utility theory incorporates the epistemic beliefs about realization of all possible outcomes. However, qualita tive utility may be viewed as order-of-magnitude ap proximation of quantitative utility. We think that the position in the middle ground between the two camps is a good one. That avoids criticisms both camps make toward the other. For quantitative utility, a common critique is that it often demands more than realisti cally available assessments of uncertainty and prefer ences for standard lotteries. For decision rules such as maximin, the critique is that it is too conservative and often ignores information even when available. It is easy to find examples in which maximin rule leads to unrealistic choices. Although we do not claim that the earthquake example is a realistic one, it helps to illustrate our point. In order to calculate vNM utility, we arc suppose to have a probability distribution of earthquakes (despite the fact that earthquake special ists say that these are hard to come by) and we need to assess precise utilities for each of the earthquake in tensities. On the other hand, if the maximin rule were used, people would base their decisions on the effects of intensity 12 earthquake which is not realistic. Our qualitative utility theory demands assessments of un certainty in terms of epistemic beliefs and assessments of qualitative utilities for each of the earthquake in tensities, a reasonable middle ground between the two extremes.
